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Evolutionary Variations in Service Trade Barriers in Banking 
and their Impact: The Case of the ASEAN+31 
Xiaobing Feng  SHIFT Shanghai China 
ILan Alon Rollins Business School Florida USA  
 
Abstract 
 Although there has been extensive research on the ASEAN+3 that reveals a 
synchronization of regional economic patterns, including exchange rate management 
policies, research on the pattern of trade policies in the banking sector is limited. In 
this paper, we evaluate the trade barriers in banking and their evolution using data 
from three sequential surveys conducted by the World Bank and other international 
organizations. We find that the salient dispersions in trade restriction policies remain 
over time. We find no evidence of moves in the direction of liberalization in the sector. 
However, the micro- and macro-effects of the restrictions on trade in banking are 
complex. The economic modeling in this study provides an indication of real income 
gains and cost increases. The stability effects vary by country.  
 
Key Words: Service trade in banking, Trade restrictiveness index, Restriction impacts 
 
1. Introduction 
   
A trade barrier in banking services is a general term that describes any 
government policy or regulation that restricts factor movements in international 
banking services trade.  
, the main research challenge has been to transform essentially regulatory 
measures into quantitative data to allow comparisons across time and country. The 
earliest simple frequency measure was developed by Hoekman (1996). A more 
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elaborate set of frequency measures, called the trade restrictive index (TRI), covering 
six industries, including banking in Australia (McGuire 1998; McGuire and Schuele 
2001; Dee 2005a), was constructed by a research team at the Australia Productivity 
Commission, the University of Adelaide, and the National University of Australia. 
Researchers at the OECD (Dihel and Kalinova 2004; Dihel and Shepherd 2007; 
Nordås and Kox 2009) have challenged the TRI evaluation methodology for its 
subjective allocations of weights to the various regulatory components. Instead, they 
use statistical factor analysis to identify weights through the variations in the data.  
 
However, there exist two problems in the current approaches: First, low 
cross-country variations in terms of restrictions may have little or no relationship with 
the relative economic importance of particular restriction categories. The more 
important restrictions, if they are applied widely and consistently across countries, 
might also have low cross-country variations and thus low factor analysis weights 
(Doove et al. 2001). To resolve the first problem, we conducted a survey by 
interviewing CEOs in twenty multinational banks in China to evaluate the subjective 
weights based on their personal opinions. Meanwhile, a statistical factor analysis 
approach was applied to derive more objective weights from the data. Factor analysis 
is a statistical method used to describe variability among observed variables in terms 
of a potentially lower number of unobserved variables that are called factors.2 
Detailed analysis of the results is presented in Section 2. A. 
   Second, economy-wide econometric studies are subject to the Lucas critique 
(1976). The Lucas critique argues that it is naïve to attempt to predict the effects of a 
change in economic policy entirely on the basis of relationships observed in historical 
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 Factor analysis, of which the principal components technique is an application, can simplify a complex set of 
data by combining many correlated variables into a smaller number of (unobserved) dimensions or factors. The 
factors have a statistical property in that they account for most of the variance in the restriction categories;  in 
this sense, they represent a ‘best fit’ of the variables under study. In this study, factor analysis is imposed on the 
various scores of the different regulations. Some regulations are continuous variables, such as the ‘minimum 
capital requirement for entry’; some are discrete numbers, such as ‘whether there are any background or 
experience requirements for future bank managers’.’ We rescaled the scores so that the values are comparable. 
 3
data. In a 1976 paper Lucas drives home the point that this simple notion invalidates 
policy advice based on conclusions drawn from large-scale macroeconometric models. 
Because the parameters of those models are not structural, i.e., not policy-invariant, 
they will necessarily change whenever policy is changed. Hence, estimates of flows 
on economic variables are appropriate only if the economy remains within the same 
structure; they can be highly misleading in the face of any structural change or any 
policy or regulatory change during the period. When the data cover a long time period, 
there may be more than two different structural changes.  The ideal way to address 
this issue is to evaluate the TRI on an annual basis to trace any variations. However, 
countries generally do not change their trade policies with such frequency, nor are 
surveys conducted on an annual basis. Therefore, in this study the TRIs are updated at 
intervals of two or three years.        
The main sources of the regulatory components of the TRI are the GATS 
schedules (for WTO members). However, information in the GATS schedules is 
limited by the positive listing approach. Consequently, the schedules do not include 
all the barriers that are in place. Therefore, this research will use information from 
three sequential World Bank surveys (Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2006). The World 
Bank surveys not only contain information on entry barriers and national treatment, 
but also on operational and prudential regulations. Furthermore, they took place 
during three different time periods -- 1998-2001, 2003, and 2007-2008 -- allowing us 
to examine the evolution of the TRI across countries over time by constructing a panel 
dataset.     
 
Paralleling the calculation of the TRI, there have been efforts to estimate the 
economic effects of banking barriers. Compared with the results of studies that focus 
only on measuring the size of the barriers, these studies are able to provide profound 
insight into the impact of the barriers, such as the mechanisms through which the 
barriers may raise interest margins or reduce loan or investment volumes (Mattoo 
1999; Mattoo, Rathindran, and Subramanian 2001; Mattoo, Stern, and Zanini 2007; 
 4
Dinh and Dee 2010). The impact study also attempts to identify the general 
equilibrium linkage within the economy and the welfare implications for consumers 
from using a general equilibrium approach (Dee and Hanslow 2000; Verikios and 
Zhang 2000). Finally, a growing number of studies provide empirical evidence 
showing the relationship between financial system stability and financial regulations 
(Barth, Caprio and Ross 2001). To investigate the relationship between the 
regulatory/ownership environment and financial fragility, two discrete measures of 
whether a country’s banking system suffered a crisis are used. A higher restriction 
leads to a higher probability of crisis and financial fragility. In contrast, using 
Bloomberg equity prices, Aspachs et al. (2007), Basurto, Hofmann and Goodhart 
(2006),  and Goodhart (2004) construct a continuous measurement to measure 
financial stability or financial fragility. The measure of the probability of default is a 
transformation of the distance to the default indicator  that is used by the IMF to 
gauge the soundness of the banking sector. The countries’ fragility is then ranked 
based on this measurement. The second measurement will be used in this study due to 
the availability of data.  
   
   There are several measures that can be used in the impact study, such as 
interest income, non-interest income, net interest margin, overhead expenses, the bank 
development index, non-performing loans, or the probability of default (Kalirajan et 
al. 2000； Barth et al. 2004；Dee 2005b；Dihel and Kalinova 2004；Barth et al. 2006). 
Because of difficulties in treatment of the data and in data availability, the net interest 
margin is the focus of many studies. The problem with the net interest margin, 
however, is that the restrictions may be both rent-creating and cost-escalating, and 
there is a risk that the two effects will be cancelled out and underestimated.  
The trade barriers in services are rent-creating because the restrictions inflate 
markups. This matters crucially for how the trade or regulatory restrictions are 
modeled. It also matters crucially for their estimated effects. Those barriers that are 
listed as having a price impact via markups, and hence are rent-creating, are injected 
into the model as output tax equivalents, with the rents from these ‘taxes’ flowing to 
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the private-sector owners of the industries rather than to the government. The trade 
barriers in services are also cost-escalating because the restrictions add to the 
marginal costs. Their removal is modeled as a productivity improvement of that 
magnitude in the associated industry. 
Therefore, in this paper we use two separate impact indexes – rent-creating and cost- 
escalating. (3) 
 
Finally, most studies take a global view, resulting in limited research on a 
regional scale. This paper takes a regional perspective to estimate the TRI and the 
economic impacts in the ASEAN+3. To the best of our knowledge, there are only two 
studies that focus on regional trade restrictions in banking (Claessens and Glaessner 
1998; Rajan and Sen 2002). However, they are mainly based on a descriptive method. 
 
This study intends to answer the following two important questions: First, how 
do the ASEAN+3 countries adjust their trade barriers in banking? Is there a consistent 
pattern in the TRI as there are in other important regional economic policies, such as 
their exchange-rate arrangements (Feng and Wang 2010; Feng, Wang, and Hu 2010a 
and b). Second, what are the economic impacts of variations in trade barriers?  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 constructs and 
measures the trade restriction index; Section 3 describes the data and their sources; 
Section 4 estimates the economic impacts of the restrictions; and Section 5 concludes 
and suggests avenues for future research. 
 
2. Measurements of Trade Barriers in Banking 
2.1) Identification of non-prudential and prudential components and scores 
There are three steps to measure the trade barriers in banking: identification of the 
components, allocation of the scores, and estimation of the weights. We start with the 
components and then follow with the scores.   
The non-prudential components are identified by taking two steps: first, by 
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taking the WTO GATS schedule as a standard to convert the World Bank Survey Data 
(WBS) to the WTO GATS framework; second, by combining data from the World 
Bank survey, the APEC Individual Action Plan, and local legislation to provide 
additional information. 
In order to trace the evolution of banking barriers in the ASEAN+3, we need to 
ascertain information on regulatory variations. The WTO commitment schedule 
provides a static benchmark to evaluate the TRI. A growing body of research uses the 
World Bank survey data on banking regulations and practices based on information 
provided by financial supervisory authorities throughout the world (Barth et al. 2010). 
The three sequential surveys conducted during the 1998-2000, 2002-2003, and 
2006-2007 periods allow an examination of the regulatory changes in the ASEAN+3 
region. The 2009 data are derived from the APEC Individual Action Plan (APEC IAP) 
and the central banks of each country.   
 
We convert the WBS into the framework of the WTO GATS based on four trade 
modes. They are the standard four ‘modes of supply’ in services trade as specified by 
the World Trade Organization. They include: services that are traded internationally 
across borders; services that require that the consumer is in the same location as the 
producer; services that require a commercial presence in the form of foreign direct 
investment; and services that require temporary cross-border movements by laborers.  
Most of the information in the WBS belongs to the third mode, i.e., a commercial 
presence. Relying on the coding system of the two databases for matching and 
comparison, we find a very close match between the two databases (Table 1 in the 
Appendix). Information on the other three modes, when available, is provided by the 
APEC IAP which has been conducted on an annual basis starting in the year 2000.  
 
   In addition to the database’s rich time-line, the WBS also provide information on 
prudential restrictions on foreign banking services, such as the capital adequacy 
ratio. In this paper, two most common prudential measures, the capital adequacy ratio 
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and the liquidity ratio, are taken into consideration to construct the TRI.3 
The score for each component is assigned a 1 if there is any type of restriction, 
and 0 otherwise. When the survey result is a continuous rather than a discrete number, 
such as ‘yes’ or ‘no’, a ratio between 0 and 1 is calculated. 
 
2.2) Estimation of the Weights  
 
Weights are developed to measure the relative importance in the composite TRI. 
For example, prohibitions on local currency operations are more restrictive than 
restrictions on the skills and expertise of banking management personnel. Two 
methods are used to estimate the weights: subjective assessment and statistical factor 
analysis. 
  
A small-scale survey was conducted with twenty CEOs of domestic and foreign 
banks in Shanghai by distributing a questionnaire regarding the importance of the 
restrictive components. The weights are estimated by factor analysis. Following Feng 
et al. (2010), the detailed weights estimations by factor analysis are presented in 
Tables 2 and 3 in the Appendix.  
 
Prior to the factor analysis, there were experiments with various variables and 
different orders.  But the remaining combination of variables did not pass the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure (KMO) or the Bartlett tests of sphericity. Table 2 in the 
Appendix presents the results of the KMO and Bartlett tests that indicate that they are 
suitable for factor analysis 
 
                                                        
3
 When data are collected, there are also other measures of prudential regulations, including the minimum 
capital-asset ratio requirement (%), does the capital adequacy ratio vary with market risks, what fraction of revaluation 
gains is allowed as part of the minimum capital liquidity requirement (%), the number of failed banks, and the 
percentage of total bank assets accounted for by failed banks (%). But because this information is not available for all 
of the sample periods for all countries, we are left with only one or two prudential measures. 
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The second and fifth columns in Table 3 in the Appendix list the eigenvalues that 
are greater than one before and after the rotation. F1 to F4 are the four factors that 
have been extracted. Columns 3 and 6 represent the percentage of the variances that 
have been explained by the underlying factors before and after the rotation. The 
rotation has the effect of optimizing the factor structure and equalizing the relative 
importance of the factors. Table 4 presents the component matrix from which the 
corresponding weights are derived after the rotation. 
 
The actual weights are simple weighted averages of the subjective weights and the 
statistical estimated weights. 
2.3)  Evaluation Results of the TRI in the ASEAN+3 
         
The TRI is computed using the assigned scores and weights with identified 
components, as represented in equation (1).  
1 1
*
J I
jt it it
j i
TRI Score Weight
= =
=∑ ∑
                                        
(1) 
        Where i=1,2….I , are components ,  
j = 1,2…J are countries, and 
t =t1, t2.,t3…T 
 
 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the steps in the construction of the index. Figure 2 presents 
the results of the calculated TRI.  
 
Figure 1. An illustration of the construction of the trade 
restrictiveness index (TRI) 
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TRIt1 , TRIt2,  ‘’’’’’’’’’  TRIT      COMPONENTS     SCORES    
COMPOSITE WEIGHTS 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The TRI of the ASEAN+3, 2000-2009 
 
 
Note:  
From left to right, the countries are China (2000, 2003, 2007, 2009), Indonesia 
(2000, 2003, 2007, 2009), Japan (2000, 2003, 2007, 2009), Korea (2000, 2003, 2007, 
2009), Malaysia (2000, 2003, 2007, 2009), the Philippines (2000, 2003, 2007, 2009), 
Singapore (2000, 2003, 2007, 2009), Thailand (2000, 2003, 2007, 2009), and Vietnam 
(2000, 2003, 2007, 2009).  
 
Figure 2 shows the wide dispersion in the trade restriction index for the 
ASEAN+3.  The dispersion remains over the sample periods and there is no sign of 
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convergence of the restriction policies in the banking-services sector of these 
countries. Similarly, no uniform trend toward liberalization can be identified. 
Countries tend to be more cautious primarily because of the intense risk management 
aspects of the regulations required by the BIS.  
   
The TRI in the graph indicates that Japan was the most liberal nation in the 
banking services trade during the sample periods. Following Japan, South Korea, 
Indonesia, and the regional financial center in Singapore were also relatively liberal. 
China and Vietnam were among the most restrictive nations in the region, even 
though there is a trend of becoming more liberal over time.   
 
3. Data Description  
 
The data sources are summarized in Table 1. Because data for Cambodia, 
Myanmar, and the Republic of Laos are unavailable, these countries are not included 
in this study.   
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                      Table 1. Summary of the Data Sources 
Data Source Purpose Data Source Purpose 
World Bank Database 
Survey 
Components 
Scores 
Country 
Legislation: the 
Central Bank and 
the banking laws of 
each country 
Components Scores 
WTO GATS Components 
Scores 
Self-administered 
Survey 
Weights 
APEC Individual 
Action Plan 
Components 
Scores 
Bankscope 
Bloomberg 
Effect Estimation 
 
4. Estimation of the Impacts of Trade Barriers  
4.1) Evaluation of Revenue and Cost Functions 
4.1.1) Specification of the Functions  
Economists generally agree that trade barriers are detrimental to economic 
efficiency. Efficiency is defined as a comparison between what is actually produced 
(output) and the consumption of resources (input). Sealey and Lindley’s seminal paper 
(1977) analyses a bank’s behavior within the context of a profit-maximizing producer. 
In it, they specify that the output of a bank is the services provided to the debtors. In 
particular, the dollar volume of the various types of earning assets is used as the 
measurement of a bank’s output -- for example, the amount of loans a bank has 
invested-- which is analogous to the physical units of output of a non-bank firm.  For 
the purpose of the model developed in this paper, earning assets include interest 
earning assets and non-interest earning assets. Inputs are on the other side of the 
equation. The inputs of a bank include the implicit services incurred to attract 
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depositors, including capital, labor, and material, plus normal profits or the interest 
margin, which is the difference between the lending rate and the borrowing rate times 
the amount of loans. The operational trade restriction enters as a markup to the cost, a 
sub-component of the total costs.4 
Hence, the revenue function is defined as in equation (2) and the entry trade 
barrier enters into the profit equation as the monopolistic margin to the normal 
interest margin: 
, ,, ,
, ,
1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1
Pr
I T QI T P
it p it q it it it
i t p i t q
R IeAsset NIeAsset C ofit
= = = = = =
= + = +∑ ∑                           
        int*)arg(Pr
,
LoanAmoTRIinteMInterestRaofit
itentryit
+=   
    Where i=1,2----I are the individual countries, 
     t= 1,2…T are the time periods, 
p=1,2…P are the numbers of interest earning assets, 
q=1,2…Q are the numbers of non-interest earning assets,  
IeAsset is all the income from interest earning assets, 
NieAsset is all the income from non-interest earning assets,  
TRIentry is the entry trade restriction index dummy   
             (2) 
We define the cost function as follows: 
, ,, , , ,
, ,
1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1
I T QI T P I T R
it p it q it it
i t p i t q i t r
C IeExp NIeExp PersonnelExp TRI
= = = = = = = = =
= + + +∑ ∑ ∑  
it
PTI
pti
QTI
qti
itqitpit profitNIeAssetIeAssetC −+= ∑ ∑
=== ===
..
1,1,1
,,
1,1.1
,,
 
Where i=1,2----I are the individual countries, 
      t= 1,2…T are the time periods, 
p=1,2…P are the numbers of interest earning expenses, 
q=1,2…Q are the numbers of non-interest earning expenses, 
r=1,2…R are the numbers of personnel expenses, 
                                                        
4As noted, diverse service barriers are classified by restrictions of entry or restrictions of establishment versus 
restrictions on operations after entry or establishment. 
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IeExp  are all interest earning expenses,  
NieExp are all non-interest earning expenses, 
PersonnelExp are personnel expenses, 
TRI  is the  operational trade restriction index dummy.                                
(3) 
 
Equation (3) denotes that the cost is the value of all types of expenses, which is 
analogous to the money value of the inputs of a non-financial firm. Operational 
restrictions enter as a markup to the cost, a sub-component of the costs.    
Entry trade restrictions are imposed into price system as a quasi tariff, and 
operational trade restrictions5 are imposed into cost structure, thus affecting the 
productivity of the industry. 
4.1.2) Panel Data Sampling 
 
In order to evaluate equations (2) and (3), the Bankscope database is used. It 
provides standardized accounting data on publicly listed banks in the ASEAN+3 
during the sample period. The standard accounting data include the balance sheets and 
the income statements of the 2,183 banks available in the database. However, the 
sample periods for each bank vary and are identified separately. We are therefore left 
with 269 banks whose sample periods fall between 2000 and 2009. The panel dataset 
includes a total of 269*10 data points. The estimated results of the revenue and cost 
functions are presented in Tables 4 and 5 in the Appendix.  
 
4.2) Micro Impacts of Restrictiveness  
-- Productivity equivalent and tax equivalent 
 
This section evaluates the productivity and tax equivalent, which measures the 
percentage change in cost and revenue due to the TRI in banking. The formulas are 
                                                        
5
 For example, it takes three months for approval of foreign bank entry. After liberalization, it takes one week. 
Less labor will be required for the same amount of work.    
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specified as follows: 
 
Productivity _ Equivalent=(C1 – C0 )/C0 *100% 
Tax_ Equivalent=(P1 – P0 )/P0 *100%                                  
(4) 
 
Where C1 ,P1  are the predicted cost and revenue when there are trade barriers; 
and 
C0 , P0 are the predicted cost and revenue when there are no trade 
barriers.  
The estimated coefficients are presented in Tables 4 and 5 in the 
Appendix. 
 
Figure 3 presents the productivity equivalent and tax equivalent with respect to the 
TRI. It posits that the productivity and tax equivalents are both positive, which 
indicates a positive relationship between cost and revenue and the TRI. Trade 
restrictions increase the costs of providing services and monopolistic revenue. This 
finding provides an additional dimension to the results of Kalirajan et al. (2000). In 
terms of individual countries, the two effects are greater in Malaysia, Vietnam, and 
China where there are higher TRIs; and the effects are smaller in Japan and Singapore 
where the TRIs are relatively lower. A further implication is that the productivity 
equivalent is higher than the tax equivalent, and the restrictiveness has a larger impact 
on cost than on revenue. 
 
Figure 3. Productivity and Tax Equivalents 
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4.3) The Macro Impacts of Restrictiveness: The Relationship between the TRI 
and Stability 
  
Many emerging market economies rely on capital controls to avoid unwanted 
disruptions in international capital flows (Eichengreen 2003). Trade barriers in 
banking are considered to be one of the critical capital control instruments to maintain 
financial and macroeconomic stability.  They are also a tool to protect domestic 
markets. Banking is a dominant financing channel for the majority of the ASEAN+3 
countries. Restrictions on foreign bank entry and operations represent major 
restrictions on capital flows in these countries. In this section, the macro impacts of 
trade barriers on the stability of the financial system are investigated. 
 
To measure financial stability or financial fragility, we follow the approach 
developed by Aspachs et al. (2007), Basurto, Hofmann, and Goodhart (2006), and 
Goodhart (2004). The measure of fragility is the probability of default. The 
probability of default is the transformation of the distance to the default indicator (DD) 
used by the IMF to gauge the soundness of the banking sector. The variables used to 
calculate the DD indicator are obtained from Bloomberg equity prices and from 
information on the balance sheets of the banks in each country. 
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In a standard valuation model, the DD indicator is determined by the market value 
of bank i’s asset, V; the uncertainty or volatility of asset i’s values, σ; the degree of 
leverage or extent of the bank’s contractual liabilities, measured as the book value of 
liability at time t, D; and the maturity of debt is T.   
 
2
,
( / ) ( 1 / 2 )i t t i
t
i
Ln V D T
DD
T
µ σ
σ
+ −
=
                       
(5) 
where µ measures the mean growth of V of bank i. 
The market value V and the volatility of σ are typically estimated using Black and 
Scholes (1973) and the option pricing model (Merton 1974). 
 
Once the DD is computed, the theoretical probability of default (PoD) is obtained 
from (6) 
 
PoDt = N(-DDt)                                    
(6) 
  
where N refers to the cumulative probability distribution function (cdf) for a 
variable that is standard, normally distributed with 0 of the mean and 1 of the standard 
deviation (Vassalou and Xing 2004). 
 
 
 17
 
   Note: Stability is measured by the probability of default. 
 
Figure 4 presents the stability measures with respect to the trade restrictiveness 
index in each country. There are several interesting observations.  First, in general, 
there seems to be no consistent trend between these two measures. Second, 
countrywide, in the cases of Japan and Singapore, the probability of default is lower 
and the TRI is not higher, as one would expect, compared with the other nations. The 
TRIs are relatively higher in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia, but they have 
not led to a lower probability of default and higher stability. Third, it appears that the 
higher TRIs in China and Vietnam, the only cases where the two lines cross, are 
associated with a lower probability of default.   
Unlike Barth, Caprio and Ross (2001) who find that regulatory restrictiveness is 
positively linked with financial fragility, we find it is difficult to generalize from the 
sample. The relationship varies case by case. Furthermore, financial stability is not 
only a result of the regulatory environment; there are other contributory factors. One 
example is the macro global financial environment.  
5. Conclusions and Future Research 
The banking sector is one of the most important service sectors for the economies 
in the ASEAN+3, in particular, the developing economies. It is one of the largest 
contributors to gross domestic product, production, and employment. In order to 
further develop and reform the banking sector, countries should identify the trade 
barriers or restrictions and evaluate the consequential impacts of these restrictions.    
Figure 4. The Impact of Restrictions on System Stability 
0
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  Unlike several other economic macro-variables, such as the exchange rate, which 
show a sign of convergence in regional behavioral patterns, there is a dispersion of 
trade policies in the banking sector. Furthermore, the dispersion pattern continues 
throughout the sample period.  The observed dispersion can be accounted for by 
country differences in terms of the stage of development of their capital markets, the 
evolution of trade policy, and economic development. 
 
  The micro and macro effects of trade restrictions are complex. The economic 
modeling in this study provides indications of real income gains and cost increases; 
however, the stability effects vary from country to country. More research is needed 
to understand the additional implications. Our partial equilibrium study provides a 
foundation for general equilibrium modeling. CGE modeling can incorporate more 
detailed service-sector data and simulate revenue and cost effects to explore the 
effects on resource allocations and social welfare. 
 
6. Appendix  
 
Table 1. Matching Components between the WTO and the World Bank 
Schemes  
Type Component 
Category 
Component 
Description 
WTO  
Code 
World Bank 
Code 
Other 
Sources 
Non- 
Prudenti
al 
1)Market 
Access/ 
Investment 
1.Licensing of banks 
 
WTO 103,  
WTO 104, 
WTO 106, 
WTO 107 
 
WB 1.10a,  
WB 1.10b,  
WB 1.11.1,  
WB 1.11..2,  
WB 1.11.3 
 
2.Foreign equity 
limitations 
WTO 108 WB 1.12.1  
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3. Limitations on 
foreign bank shares of 
banking system assets 
WTO 109  
 
WB 3.8.2  
4.Forms of entry 
 
WTO 
1.12.1,  
WTO 
1.12.2,  
WTO 1.12.3 
WB 1.12.1,  
WB 1.12.2,  
WB 1.12.3 
 
5.Minimum capital 
requirements 
  LL 
&APEC  
6. Expansion of a 
physical presence 
WTO 105a  
 
Not 
comparable 
WB 
component 
 
7.Composition of the 
board of directors 
 
WTO 105b 
 
Not 
comparable 
WB 
component 
 
8. Local currency 
operations 
  LL 
&APEC 
9. Intended market 
differentiation of new 
banks 
  LL 
&APEC 
 10. Sources of funds 
in the capitalization of 
new banks 
  LL 
&APEC 
2)Market 
Access 
/Nature 
11. Period of stay for 
the CEO or 
management staff 
  LL 
&APEC 
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Person 12. Requirements of 
the CEO or 
management staff 
  LL 
&APEC 
3) National 
Treatment 
13. Ratio between the 
number of denied 
domestic applications 
to the number of 
denied foreign 
applications  
 * LL 
&APEC 
14. Ratio between the 
number of foreign 
banks to the number 
of domestic banks 
 * LL 
&APEC 
15. Security    LL 
&APEC 
16. Insurance   LL 
&APEC 
17. Real Estate   LL 
&APEC 
Prudenti
al 
4)Prudential 18.Minimum 
capital-asset ratio 
requirement  
  LL 
&APEC 
19.Does the 
capital-asset ratio 
vary with market risk 
  LL 
&APEC 
20. What fraction of 
the revaluation gains 
is allowed as part of 
capital 
  LL 
&APEC 
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21.Minimum liquidity 
requirement (%) 
<=1year 
  LL 
&APEC 
 
Notes: 1) The scores are assigned 0 if no restrictions are apparent, and 1 if there 
are restrictions; 2) The coding systems are from Barth et al. (2010) and the authors’ 
own identifications using the WTO GATS and WBS; ‘*’ are the calculated continuous 
values between 0 and 1. They are the relative ratios for the corresponding component 
of each country. 
      3) LL&APEC denotes local legislation and the APEC Individual Action 
Plan Database. 
 
 
Table 2. The Results of the KMO and Bartlett Tests 
KMO measure 0.622>0.5 
Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity 
χ Square 174.521 
Significance  0.000(significant) 
  Note: Kaiser (1974) recommends that a KMO statistic greater than 0.5 indicates 
factor analysis is appropriate. Bartlett’s measure tests the null hypothesis that the 
original matrix is an identity. We reject this, hence a significance value of less than 
0.05 is required. 
 
Table 3. Identification of Variance-Explained Weights  
Components Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Eigenvalues % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Eigenvalues % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
F1 3.350 30.457 30.457 2.573 23.388 23.388 
F2 2.737 24. 55.34 2.299 20. 44.28
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883 1 901 9 
F3 1.300 11.
815 
67.15
6 
2.069 18.
811 
63.10
0 
F4 1.006 9.1
41 
76.29
7 
1.452 13.
197 
76.29
7 
Note: A principal components extraction method is employed. 
 
Table 4. Component Matrix after Rotation 
 Components 
 F1                  
F2 
F3            F4 
Background/experience of 
future directors 
0.521  
Background/experience of 
future managers 
0.654  
Minimum capital 
requirements 
-0.720  
Intended market 
differentiation of new 
banks 
0.483  
Sources of funds for the 
capitalization of new 
banks 
0.601  
Local currency operations  0.654 
Insurance activities  -0.772 
Securities activities  -0.720 
Is there a maximum 
percentage of capital that 
 0.633 
 23
can be owned by a foreign 
owner? 
Minimum capital-asset 
ratio requirement (%) 
                     
0.805 
Minimum liquidity 
requirement (%) <=1year 
                     
0.601 
Note: According to standard treatment, those values that are less than 0.4 are 
suppressed in the output table.  
 
Table 4.  Regression Summary for the Cost Function-Fixed Effect 
 Coefficients T-Statistics    F-Statistics 
InterestExp 0.0526231 2.69 
NonInterestExp 0.3757808 4.45 
PersonnelExp 0.448004 4.82 
TRI 0.1904781 1.53 
Constant 0.0323136 1.08            7.40 
InterestExp0 0.0489929 2.51 
NonInterestExp0 0.3737255 4.42 
PersonnelExp0 0.4328634   4.67 
Constant0 0.0326024 1.09             4.36 
Note: The significance levels are 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Table 5.  Regression Summary for the Profit Function-Fixed Effect 
 Coefficients T-Statistics    F-Statistics 
Cost -0.4398412 -2.25 
Profit 0.1306937 1.04 
TRI 0.4208811 1.54 
Constant 0.0082863 1.11       3.90 
 24
Cost0 -0.4383276 -2.25 
Profit0 0.1297399 1.13 
Constant0 0.008857  1.12       4.82 
Note: The significance levels are 5% and 10% respectively. 
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